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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1974, Ohio's treatment of affirmative defenses in crimi-
nal cases followed the common law tradition i.e. if a defendant in-
tended to rely upon one of the recognized "affirmative defenses,"' he
bore the burden of proving that defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. Although this practice has often been challenged, its valid-
ity has always been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court.2
Notwithstanding this history, when the Technical Committee to
Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedure issued its proposed Ohio
Criminal Code, they suggested that all affirmative defenses be codi-
fied and that the Ohio rule concerning the burden of proof on those
defenses be changed. The committee recomended that Ohio adopt the
federal rule i.e. the defendant bears the burden of initial production
on affirmative defenses," but once the issue is raised, the prosecution
must bear the risk of non-persuasion and convince the trier of fact,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defense is not valid.4 In other
words, the defendant would only be required to create a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a defense.
As the committee's proposal made its way through the legislative
process, it engendered much debate and was the subject of significant
I Since 1806, there have been no common law crimes in Ohio. Final Report of the Techni-
cal Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, PROPOSED OHIo CRIMINAL
CODE, Comments to the Proposed Section 2901.03 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROP. OHIO
CRIM. CODE]. Affirmative defenses, however, have never been codified. See PROP. OHIO CRIM.
CODE, Comments to Proposed Section 2901.32. Ohio has recognized the traditional defenses
of self-defense, duress, intoxication, insanity, etc., and the elements of those defenses have been
judicially formulated. In addition the legislature has, in the formulation of specific offenses,
delineated certain affirmative defenses or exceptions, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.01(A)
(Page, 1975) [hereinafter cited as OHIO REV. CODE] (making proof of five years continous
absence of a spouse a defense to a charge of bigamy).
2 Compare the court's own listing of cases in State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St. 2d 18, 294 N.E.2d
888 (1973).
1 As the committee noted in its comment to § 2901.05, it would be absurd to require that
the prosecution negate all possible defenses in its case-in-chief since affirmative defenses are a
factor in only a limited number of criminal prosecutions. In fact it may have been a considera-
tion of this hardship that led courts to allocate the persuasion burden to the defendant. These
rules were formulated at a time when the distinction between the burden of production and the
persuasion burden was not generally articulated, and courts may have felt that there was only
one burden on any given issue. For a discussion of the distinction, see E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3336 (2d ed. 1974).
PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE, § 2901.05(B).
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amendment.' When it emerged as an act of the Ohio General Assem-
bly, almost all of the codified defenses had been deleted6 and the
treatment of the burden of proof issue was reduced to a somewhat
cryptic sentence which simply stated: "The burden of going forward
with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused." 7
At a minimum, this provision requires that the defendant raise
a defense which the state need not have negated in its case-in-chief,
but it was unclear whether it intended to change existing law and
require that the state disprove the asserted defense beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. Professors Schroeder and Katz, in their treatise on Ohio
criminal law, take the position that the provision does change existing
law,8 but it is difficult to understand why the legislature would substi-
tute the language cited above for the clear language of the committee
proposal if they intended to effectuate the change that was suggested.
The Ohio supreme court apparently saw no change in the law
when it made its first interpretation of § 2901.05. On July 2, 1975,
the court decided State v. Rogers,9 a case in which the defendant
sought to rely upon the defense of justifiable use of deadly force.
Although resolution of the burden of proof issue was not absolutely
necessary to the decision," the court said that § 2901.05 "places the
burden of going forward with the evidence [of an affirmative defense]
upon the accused. . . to prove that issue by a preponderance of the
5 See Note, The Proposed Affirmative Defenses of Forced Perpetration, Entrapment,
Intoxication and Insanity, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 397 (1972) for a discussion of the proposed code
as it emerged from the Ohio House. At this point, the proposed codification of defenses
remained virtually intact but § 2901.05 had been changed to place the persuasion burden upon
the defendant to establish insanity and intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence.
I OHIo REv. CODE 2901.05 defines an affirmative defense as either of the following:
(1) A defense expressly designated as affirmative;
(2) A defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge
of the accused...
The only defenses that are expressly designated are those that the legislature engrafted onto
specific criminal provisions. All of the codifications dealing with the traditional defenses of
duress, insanity, etc., were deleted and it must be assumed that they are included within subpart
(2) and will retain their character as common law defenses.
'OHto REV. CODE § 2901.05(A).
'1 0. SCHRADER & L. KATZ, OHIO CRIMINAL LAW PRACrICE Tit. 29 at 14 (1974).
1 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 330 N.E.2d 674 (1975).
10 Defendant Rogers, charged with murder, sought to rely upon OHIO REv. CODE §
2935.04 which allows private citizens to make an arrest, but OHIO REv. CODE § 2935.07 requires
that before making such an arrest, a citizen must inform the arrestee of his intention. Rogers
conceded that he had failed to give such notice, 43 Ohio St. 2d at 32, 330 N.E.2d at 677, and
so he had not even created a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a defense. In addition,
since the killing had occurred in September of 1972, new § 2901.05 was not applicable. 134
OHIO LAws 2034 (1972).
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evidence."'" Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the syllabus of
the opinion repeats the requirement that the defendant must go for-
ward with evidence of an affirmative defense but fails to mention
which party bears the burden of persuasion or the quantum of proof
necessary to meet that burden.' 2 Because of Ohio's syllabus rule the
court has not definitively answered the question of who bears the
burden of persuasion on affirmative defenses. 3
If past treatment of the issue by the courts and legislative intent
were the only considerations to weigh in determining who will bear
the burden of persuasion on affirmative defenses in future trials, it is
likely that Ohio defendants will continue to shoulder that burden. It
is the thesis of this note, however, that Ohio must add to its list of
relevant considerations the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in In re Winship" and Mullaney v. Wilbur15 and the due process
requirements which they articulate. Once these elements are added,
it becomes clear that, as to certain affirmative defenses, the state may
not constitutionally require the defendant to prove these defenses by
a preponderance of the evidence and that as to other defenses this
practice is of doubtful validity.
II. Winship AND Wilbur
When the Supreme Court decided In re Winship it made two
separate decisions: one had a significant and immediate impact upon
the treatment of juvenile defendants; the other was quietly acknowl-
edged and deceptively obvious. First, as a prelude to its second deci-
sion, the Court found that "the Due Process Clause protects the
accused [in a criminal prosecution] against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged."'" This holding did not seem
especially important since almost all of the states had previously
n 43 Ohio St. 2d at 33, 330 N.E.2d at 677 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 28, 330 N.E.2d at 675. It is interesting to note that on August 26, 1975, the
Franklin Couty Court of Appeals interpreted OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.05 to require that the
state must bear the burden of persuasion on affirmative defenses. The court had Mullaney v.
Wilbur before it but found it inapplicable. The court made no mention of the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Rogers. State v. Robinson, 75 AP 130, (Franklin County Court of Appeals,
Aug. 26, 1975).
11 Under Ohio law, only the points of law set out in the syllabus are considered as having
the force of law. The statements made in the body of the opinion are the conclusions of the
judge writing the opinion. Haas v. State, 103 Ohio St. 1,7-8, 132 N.E. 158, 159 (1921).
1, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
15 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975).
16 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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subscribed to that principle. It was, however, necessary to lodge this
requirement in the due process clause so that the Court could go on
to hold that since the New York juvenile proceeding in question was
essentially a criminal prosecution, youthful defendants were entitled
to have the state prove their guilt by the same degree of proof as their
adult counterparts. It was this second holding on juvenile offender's
rights that most impressed legal writers, and they addressed them-
selves to this aspect of the case while noting that the Court had in
the process constitutionalized the requirement that the prosecution
must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 One
writer noted however that "Winship's eventual impact may turn on
the extent to which courts will insist that some specific fact. . . is a
necessary element of a crime . . . .
Since that time the commentators have suggested that Winship
must be read broadly to ensure that the criminal sanction, which is
the most onerous society can levy, be used sparingly and only in
appropriate cases." Winship itself, however, did not articulate a pre-
cise test to determine what "facts" are necessary elements of any
given crime. Because the state of New York was disputing only the
quantum of proof required, not its responsibility to bear the persua-
sion burden, the Court did not have to address itself to that question.
However, in explaining its decision that due process required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal prosecutions, the Court
articulated concepts which helped them to answer that question when
it arose in Mullaney v. Wilbur.
In Winship, the Court concluded that the guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt standard was necessary to protect both the interests of the
criminal defendant and society. Because of the value placed upon
personal freedom and integrity, the criminal defendant must be pro-
tected against the unwarranted deprivations and stigmatization that
can result from an erroneous conviction. At the same time society is
interested in insuring that, to the maximum extent possible, only
"guilty" persons are being convicted because individual citizens will
be distrustful of a legal system that convicts an excessive number of
truly innocent persons. Building upon these broad doctrines, the court
in Wilbur offered a partial answer to the question of what constitutes
a "fact" within the meaning of Winship.
11 See, e.g., Comment, Juveniles Must Be Proven Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
When Accused of Criminal Violations, 46 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 373 (1971).
' The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 157, 159 (1970)(footnote omitted).
W, . LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 8 at 48 (1972).
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A. Wilbur's Trek to the Top
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. was charged with the murder of Claude
Herbert. At trial the judge charged the jury that in Maine there are
two kinds of homicide, murder and manslaughter; that both crimes
have as elements an unlawful, i.e. without justification or excuse, and
intentional killing; and furthermore, that if the state proves these two
elements beyond a reasonable doubt the jury may find the defendant
guilty of murder. The jury may convict on the lesser charge of man-
slaughter only if the defendant proves provocation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Wilbur was found guilty of murder."0
Wilbur appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, arguing
that the fact which distinguished murder from manslaughter was
malice aforethought and that Winship would not allow the state to
require him to disprove an element of the crime by showing provoca-
tion. The Maine supreme court rejected this, saying that Maine law
recognized only one crime of felonious homicide and that manslaugh-
ter was a punishment category within that crime. The court con-
cluded that Winship did not apply to a factor that was not an element
of the crime, but that only served to reduce the defendant's sentence.21
Wilbur petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. The writ was granted and the state appealed to the first circuit.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court, holding that
murder and manslaughter were distinct crimes in Maine and that
malice aforethought or the absence of provocation were elements of
the crime of murder. Because malice aforethought was a fact within
the meaning of the Winship holding, the state must prove its existence
beyond a reasonable doubt. 22
At this point, the Maine supreme court again had occasion to
address itself to the murder-manslaughter distinction in State v.
Lafferty.2 The court disagreed with the first circuit's interpretation
of Maine law and reiterated its holding that in Maine there was only
one crime of felonious homocide and that the distinction between
murder and manslaughter was made only for the purpose of sentenc-
ing. Since malice aforethought was not a substantive element of the
offense charged, it was not a fact within the meaning of Winship, and
the state could constitutionally require the defendant to prove provo-
cation by a preponderance.
20 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1883-84 (1975).
21 State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 145-46 (Me. 1971).
2Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 (1973).
309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973).
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With the case in this position, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and remanded it to the first circuit for reconsideration in light
of Lafferty.24 The court of appeals accepted the Maine supreme
court's interpretation of the law this time, but nonetheless concluded
that Winship was still applicable.21 The Supreme Court again granted
certiorari .2
B. The Opinion
As its first order of business the Court refused to disregard the
Maine supreme court's interpretation of the law of homocide and find
that the crimes of murder and manslaughter are distinct. The Court
said simply:
[W]e accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's con-
struction of state homocide law.2Y
The issue then resolved itself into whether the state of Maine
could constitutionally require a criminal defendant who is guilty of
felonious homocide to prove provocation in order to reduce his pun-
ishment category from murder, which calls for life imprisonment, to
manslaughter, which calls for a fine or imprisonment for a period not
to exceed twenty years. First, the state argued that since provocation
was not an element of felonious homocide, it was not a "fact" within
the meaning of Winship and therefore the state need not bear the
burden on that issue.28 Second, since the jury was not to consider the
provocation issue until after it had concluded that the defendant was
guilty of felonious homocide, the defendant would already be subject
to the stigma of a criminal conviction and would have forfeited his
freedom for at least some period of time. The state reasoned that
Winship was only concerned with the initial deprivation of freedom
and stigmatization and not with the degree; therefore the state could
require the defendant to prove that he was not a proper candidate for
the stiffer penalty.29
The Court considered the general thrust of the state's argument
to be misplaced, and stated that "Winship is concerned with sub-
stance rather than this kind of formalism."30 The Court emphasized
24 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
- 496 F.2d 1303 (1974).
419 U.S. 823 (1974).
95 S. Ct. at 1886.
Id. at 1888.
" Id. at 1889.
Id. at 1890 (footnote omitted).
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that the goal of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard was
to protect both the criminal defendant and society;31 and to obtain
practical results, rather than the formal or theoretical classification
of criminal sanctions into "elements" of the crime and sentencing
factors. In this case, Wilbur faced either life imprisonment if sent-
enced for murder, or a maximum of twenty years imprisonment or a
fine if sentenced for manslaughter. The only fact that determined
which sanction would be imposed was the presence or absence of
legally adequate provocation.
The Court went on to specifically address itself to the state's
contentions. The Court first rebuffed the state's argument that
Winship could be limited to those "facts" that the state chose to
include in its definition of an offense. If such a course were allowed,
the state could define a few broad classes of crimes and relegate other
traditional elements into a class of facts which would be punishment
factors that the defendant would have to prove if he wanted to reduce
his period of incarceration. 2 To the state's second argument, the
Court replied that Winship is concerned with degrees of deprivation
and stigmatization. The Court noted that in Maine a person guilty
of murder is considered to be more culpable and that as a practical
matter an individual found guilty of murder will be subject to at least
some loss of freedom while an individual guilty of manslaughter
could conceivably be subjected to only a fine.3
Finally, the Court pointed out that in this case society's interest
in preventing erroneous convictions was less protected than it had
been in Winship. In Winship the state of New York had acknowl-
edged its persuasion burden and only sought to use a lesser quantum
of proof. In New York at least, it was more likely than not that the
juvenile defendant was guilty, because the state had to prove guilt by
a preponderance of evidence. However, in Maine, it was as likely as
not that the defendant subject to the penalty for murder should have
been subjected to the penalty for manslaughter, because the defen-
dant had to prove provocation by a preponderance. Therefore, if the
proof was equal in the jury's mind, the defendant would lose. Any-
time a criminal defendant is required to raise more than a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a necessary fact, society must question
the reliability of that individual's conviction. 34
31 Id. at 1890.
12 Id. at 1889-90.
1 Id. at 1889.
31 Id. at 1890.
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The Court's opinion is not without its problems, however. While
its conclusion that the substance of a given situation should govern
due process rights seems correct, this in no way aids a state in deter-
mining the "substance" of any given criminal prosecution. This sub-
stance over form approach is not as much a test as a restatement of
the Winship holding that the prosecution must bear the persuasion
on all necessary "facts." It merely replaces the word "fact" with
"substance," and fails to formulate a clear test to determine the
substance of a crime. It is suggested that other lines of analysis
implicit in the Wilbur opinion provide a partial answer to the ques-
tion of what constitutes "substance."
First, the Court notes that this decision in no way should be
interpreted as casting doubt upon the discretion of trial judges to
impose varying sentences for commission of the same crime, and that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the factors considered by the
judge in making his decision is not required. 5 To distinguish the
Maine situation from the normal sentencing procedure, the Court
noted that in Maine the jury decided whether the murder or man-
slaughter sentence will be imposed and that its decision turns upon
the fact of provocation; only after the jury determination does the
judge impose a sentence within the statutory bounds. One can only
speculate as to what the Court would have concluded if the Maine
scheme only required the jury to make a finding of guilt on the charge
of felonious homocide and then allowed the trial judge to consider the
element of provocation when sentencing the defendant. It is suggested
that the result would not have been different because it may be that
the Court was more impressed with form than it acknowledged. If
Maine has decided that the resolution of one factual issue is determi-
native of the sanction to be imposed, then it may be said that the state
has decided that a factual issue must be resolved before it will impose
one sanction as opposed to another. "By drawing this distinction,
while refusing to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reason-
able doubt the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests
found critical in Winship.""8
Second, one cannot help but suspect that the Court was less
3s Id. at 1889 n.23. If the degree of deprivation and stigmatization were the only criteria
used to invoke the Winship doctrine, then any difference in the sentencing of defendants would
have to be justified by proof of the determining factor. The distinguishing point present here is
that the state made the presence or absence of one fact determinative of outcome. Compare
the treatment of proof in habitual offender statutes. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18,
at 46.
31 95 S. Ct. at 1889.
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willing to accept Maine's interpretation of its law of homocide than
it professed. Justice Powell engages in a detailed study of the distinc-
tion between murder and manslaughter at common law and con-
cludes that:
First, the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of the heat of
passion on sudden provocation-has been, almost from the incep-
tion of the common law of homocide, the single most important
factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an un-
lawful homocide. And, second, the clear trend has been toward
requiring the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving this
fact. 7
If the Court accepts Maine's interpretation of the law of homocide,
one is hard pressed to understand why the historical growth of the
law of homocide is relevant. The analysis could easily lend itself to
an opinion that concludes that some distinctions in the criminal law
are so basic to "fundamental fairness" that states may not, consistent
with due process, do away with classifications of crime that are so
engrained in our history and that differentiate between degrees of
criminal culpability long recognized by society at large. It is under-
standable that the Court was reluctant to reach such a far-reaching
decision, and on the facts of the case it was not necessary, because
Maine does make a distinction between murder and manslaughter.
It recognizes that those who kill with provocation are "different"
from those who commit other types of homocide and it provides an
alternate sanction that is similar to that of other states. The practical
effect of the Maine approach is to make the murder-manslaughter
distinction, albeit in an unusual fashion, and so the Court had no need
to decide whether the distinction is constitutionally required. Again
one can only speculate as to what the Court would have done if Maine
had decided that it would no longer recognize the separate crimes of
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter and
that all killings would be punished by life imprisonment. Implicit in
the Court's opinion is the notion that there are some distinctions in
the criminal law which must be made.
If the above analysis is correct, the following conclusions can be
said to follow:
1. The prosecution must bear the persuasion burden beyond a
reasonable doubt upon all of the issues that bear upon the degree and
type of criminal culpability of the defendant, issues that must be
31 Id. at 1888 (citations omitted).
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resolved before a finding of blameworthiness can be made." These
issues would include not only the prescribed elements of a particular
crime but also those facts that must be absent before a finding of guilt
can be made."
2. There may be some factual distinctions in the criminal law
which may not be ignored constitutionally.
IV. THE EXTENSION OF Wilbur TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Before proceeding to a discussion of the impact of Wilbur on
Ohio law, it is necessary to dispense with two preliminary matters.
First, the term "affirmative defense" has been applied to a broad
range of legal concepts. For example, alibi is often referred to as an
affirmative defense even though most jurisdictions acknowledge that
alibi is no more than a denial of the commission of the criminal act.4"
As such it is simply a rebuttal of the state's case and the only persua-
sion burden that the defendant has is to create a reasonable doubt as
to his presence at the scene of the crime.4" The Ohio supreme court
has recognized this distinction and pointed out that while alibi is
commonly referred to as an affirmative defense, it would be error to
charge the jury that the defendant must bear the persuasion burden
by a preponderance on that issue.42 It is submitted, however, that this
indiscriminate use of the term has misled courts into assuming that
because a legal construct is labelled as an "affirmative defense," the
defendant must bear the persuasion burden without examining the
theoretical basis for the so-called defense. This note will not attempt
to formulate a rigorous definition of affirmative defense but will use
the term in a loose fashion, while urging the reader to bear in mind
the fluid nature of the construct.
m This formulation attempts to exclude those defenses which in no way detract from the
defendant's guilt or blameworthiness but are created to achieve other goals. For example,
suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence does not deny the defendant's guilt, but
only seeks to prevent enforcement officials within the criminal justice system from using repre-
hensible tactics.
" This formulation follows closely the definition of "germane issues" that Ashford and
Risinger use in their analysis of presumptions. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assump-
tions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 171
(1969).
0 At one time however, Iowa required the defendant to prove alibi by a preponderance of
the evidence. This practice was declared unconstitutional even prior to Winship. Stump v.
Bennett, 398 F.2d I 11 (8th Cir. 1968).
11 Some might object to labelling a defendants rebuttal of the prosecution case a "burden."
Tradition has taught us to think of a burden of persuasion as something greater than half, but
that need not be true.
42 Sabo v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 245, 163 N.E. 28, 32-33 (1928).
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Second, no attempt will be made to make an in-depth analysis
of the theoretical underpinnings of affirmative defenses generally or
Ohio defenses in particular. It is felt that such an analysis is not
necessary or wise; rather this note will follow the general classifica-
tion of defenses suggested by Professors Scott and LaFave in their
treatise on criminal law.43 They note that defenses can be divided
into three basic types which are grouped .according to the theoretical
justification for allowing a given defense. These classfications are:
(I) Those defenses which 'negate some element of the crime
charged, e.g., mistake of fact, intoxication and possibly insanity
under some formulations.
(2) Those defenses which do not negate an element of the crime,
but which offer a justification or excuse, e.g., self defense, duress,
and necessity.
(3) Those defenses which the legislature has specifically denoted
as either an affirmative defense or an exception when the statute was
formulated.
This note will briefly sketch the justification for allowing these
defenses, note an example from Ohio law, and then attempt to gauge
the impact of Wilbur upon this class of defenses.
A. "Negative" Defenses
As noted in the discussion of alibi, there are those "affirmative
defenses" which act only to negate one of the elements of the crime
charged. In any prosecution in Ohio the state must prove that the
defendant committed a voluntary act or failed to act when he had a
duty to do so, and that he has the requisite degree of culpability for
each element of the offense charged.44 On these elements the prosecu-
tion has both the production burden and the persuasion burden and
the quantum of the persuasion must be proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.45 If the defendant offers proof that one of these elements is not
true he is seeking to raise a reasonable doubt in the juror's mind as
to the truth of the state's assertion that a necessary fact is true.
Intoxication in its usual formulation is such a negative defense.
For example, the crime charged may be that the defendant did "A"
with intent to "B". The defendant may present evidence that because
of his intoxication he either did not have the intent required or he was
physically incapable of performing act "A". In most jurisdictions,
13 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 18, at 46-47.
" OHIo REV. CODE § 2901.21.
OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.05(A).
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including Ohio, such evidence would be legally admissable to negate
the elements of the crime. In Ohio, however, it is the rule that if the
defendant would interpose the "defense" of intoxication he must
prove that by a preponderance of the evidence.
In the syllabus to Long v. State, the supreme court held:
Where, in the trial of a first degree murder case, the defendant
asserts voluntary intoxication as a defense to the prosecution, it will
be incumbent upon him to establish that degree of intoxication
which rendered him incapable of forming the intent to kill, or of
acting with premeditation and deliberation, and the burden is upon
such defendant to establish such defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. This does not, however, relieve the state of the general
burden to prove each and every element going to make up the
offense charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.46
Similarly, in the syllabus of State v. French the court said:
Where, in a prosecution for rape, the defendant, . . . introduces
evidence of intoxication to support the defense that he was physi-
cally incapable, because of such intoxication, to commit the act of
rape, it is not error for the court to charge the jury that the burden
is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
such incapacity from such cause."
A moment's reflection will reveal the odd result that such a rule
produces. If defendant X is charged with intent to rape, and raises
no intoxication issue, the state must prove his intent beyond a reason-
able doubt, whereas if defendant Y is charged with intent to rape and
alleges intoxication, he must disprove that intent by a preponderance
of the evidence. Conceivably, defendant Y can be convicted if it is as
likely as not that he intended rape. The inadequacy of the rule is even
46109 Ohio St. 77, 141 N.E. 691 (1923).
, 171 Ohio St. 501, 172 N.E.2d 613 (1961). The jury charge approved in French presents
an interesting legal paradox.
Defendant claims that he was so drunk at the time that according to his own testi-
mony he could not have had an erection or have been physically able to have comitted
any rape upon the prosecuting witness here * * *
"If the evidence is credible, evidence of the defendant is such as to create a
reasonable doubt in your minds as to his ability to commit the offense of rape,
keeping in mind that penetration is an essential element of the crime of rape, then,
of course, you must find him not guilty of the second count of the indictment. On
the other hand, if you fail to find that he has proven this defense by a preponderance
of the evidence and that the other elements which I have indicated to you have been
proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to find the
defendant guilty of the second charge or the second count in the indictment.
171 Ohio St. at 502, 172 N.E.2d at 614.
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clearer when intoxication is used to negate the act charged. It is very
much like the alibi "defense" in that the defendant is denying that
he performed the act charged.
Under Winship alone, this treatment of intoxication is unconsti-
tutional. The state is not proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as to every "fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged." 48
Before Winship constitutionalized the requirement that guilt be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a state such as Ohio could have
argued that normally the prosecution must prove every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt; however, when a defendant seeks
to raise a disfavored defense such as intoxication, that standard may
be lowered.
Little more need be said about this class of defenses except to
note that in both Long and French,49 the Ohio supreme court ex-
pressed its belief that since intoxication is not a part of the state's
case, the burden must be upon the defendant. First, this stance misap-
prehends the nature of the intoxication defense. Second, it may reveal
the confusion that can result from a failure to distinguish between the
production burden and the persuasion burden. The court is correct
that intoxication is not a part of the state's case and therefore it need
not negate the issue before the defendant raises it. If may be, how-
ever, that the court assumed there could only be "one" burden on any
issue and that since the defendant wants to interject intoxication, he
should bear that burden. This is proper if it is limited to the produc-
tion burden, but it does not follow that the persuasion burden must
rest on the same party. Even this formulation may be too broad, since
the defendant is only rebutting an issue upon which the state already
has both the production and the persuasion burden.
B. Confession and Avoidance
If any class of defenses deserves the title of "affirmative," it is
those defenses that admit the commission of the act charged with the
necessary mental element, but seek to interpose the existence of a
state of facts that, if true, would provide a complete exculpation. The
traditional defenses of duress, necessity and self-defense are common
examples. Unless one is willing to draw the concepts of volitional act
and mental element quite broadly, these defenses do not negate either
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
" 109 Ohio St. at 90-91, 141 N.E. at 695; 171 Ohio St. at 504, 172 N.E.2d at 616.
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concept." In that respect they are analogous to the common law of
confession and avoidance; they admit the truth of the facts pleaded
but offer an excuse.
The criminal law's recognition of these defenses is based upon
the belief that even though the defendant's act was in violation of the
criminal law, society does not believe any person would have acted
differently or that the actor's behavior is excusable. Because these
defenses are rather narrow and unusual exceptions to the criminal
law, it is logical that the defendant should raise the issue. Not only
do these defenses occur rarely, but the defendant has better knowl-
edge of the facts constituting the defense. It is not surprising, either,
that since the criminal law developed simultaneously with the civil
law, the common law courts allocated the persuasion burden on these
truly "affirmative defenses" to the defendant.5
Ohio has followed this tradition and it is the rule that self-
defense,52 duress, 3 and other excuse or justification defenses" be
proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. The
argument in favor of this rule is quite simple. Since this class of
defenses in no way negates the existence of an element of the state's
case it is theoretically possible for a trier of fact to conclude beyond
reasonable doubt that a defendant has committed a crime but still
bring in a verdict of not guilty. Since the defendant seeks to avoid
the punishment called for by interposing a separate factor, it is proper
for him to prove that fact.
Proponents of this rule can cite authority for their position. In
1952 the Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon55 upheld the constitu-
tionality of an Oregon rule that required defendants to prove the
defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Although not clearly
articulated, it appears that the Court accepted the argument that
since the insanity defense does not negate an element of the state's
case, it is proper to make the defendant prove it.56 In fact, Justice
Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion in Wilbur said that he felt Leland
was still valid because
-" It can be argued that, human nature being what it is, the actor in a self-defense situation
really has no choice but to use deadly force; therefore it can be said that his act was not
voluntary. This however is a far cry from the traditional formulation of a voluntary act, i.e.,
merely a conscious, willed act.
51 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 894-910 (1968).
51 Silvus v. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 (1871).
0 State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St. 63, 95 N.E. 381 (1911).
m State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 330 N.E.2d 674 (1975).
' 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
1, Id. at 794-96.
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the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary
relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental
elements of the crime."
Unless one reads "voluntary act" broadly, the same could be said of
any of the "confession and avoidance" type of defenses.
Justice Rehnquist notwithstanding, the language of the majority
opinion in Wilbur does cast some doubt upon the Leland holding. The
majority said that they were "concerned with substance rather than
• . .formalism.""S Let us assume that a given crime consists of act
"A" done with a state of mind of "B", but that under the law of the
jurisdiction, fact "X" will exculpate and prevent the imposition of the
criminal sanction even though A and B are true. In a practical sense,
it can be said that the crime does not consist of A and B alone, but
only A and B in the absence of X. No one disputes that the state may
properly assume that because X is such a rare occurrence, it is not
present in this case, and therefore dispense with proof of its absence.
Consistent with this, the jury should receive no charge upon X and
should not consider it. If however the defendant raises the issue, X
becomes a fact within the meaning of Winship, and a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of X should exculpate the defendant. As a
practical matter, confession and avoidance type defenses are an ele-
ment of every crime to which they may be legally asserted.
Some commentators have argued that if the state may consitu-
tionally dispense with X as a defense, is it not appropriate to allow
the state to make the defendant prove X by a preponderance of the
evidence? In addition, they note that these defenses are bestowed by
the "grace" of the legislature, and they may be legislatively with-
drawn if the courts require the state to disprove these defenses." One
criticism of this viewpoint is that until such time as the legislature
determines that it would be socially proper and politically safe to
follow that course of action," the state must live with the theoretical
framework it has constructed, but that answer is less than satisfac-
tory.
95 S.Ct. at 1893.
Id. at 1890.
See Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another
View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919, 933-38; Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law
Presumption of Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. REv. 973, 1000-01 (1974).
60 In answering this same argument as applied to presumptions, Ashford & Risinger note
that although this approach was suggested in Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928), the Court
has never used it since. In addition, they note that it is not at all clear that the legislature would
have passed a statute that did not contain the disputed defense. Ashford & Risinger, supra note
37, at 177-78.
COMMENT
Another more significant problem with this position is that in the
case of the traditional defenses of duress, self-defense, etc., another
answer is possible, and it questions the validity of the supposition that
the state can constitutionally dispense with these defenses. As noted
in the discussion of Wilbur, the court was concerned about the differ-
ence in the degree of culpability between murder and manslaughter
in the law of Maine. How much more difference is there between the
moral culpability of the individual who commits murder and the one
who kills in self defense? In fact we traditionally say that the individ-
ual who kills in self-defense is not morally culpable at all. It may be
that the long standing use of these traditional defenses is so engrained
in our notions of social justice that any attempt to dispense with them
would be blocked. 1 If this is true, then it would seem clear that under
the analysis of Wilbur this class of defenses are a fact within the scope
of the Winship doctrine.
C. Statutory Exceptions
The third general classification of affirmative defenses is those
which the legislature incorporates into its formulation of a crime. For
example a statute may provide that "A" and "B" are the elements
of a crime, but that fact "X" is an exception, and it will prevent a
conviction if present. This legislative intention is normally indicated
by the use of phrases such as "provided that however." Such an
exception removes from the reach of the statute acts that the legisla-
ture does not desire to criminalize, even though the acts would argua-
bly come within the broad language of the statute.
A moment's reflection will reveal that the legislature did not
really intend to make "A" and "B" a crime, but only "A" and "B"
committed in the absence of "X". The statute would be more
straightforward if it stated that "A" and "B" would be a crime if "X"
were not present." The justifications offered for this rather curious
use of language are that "X" is such a rare occurrence or is so
difficult for the prosecution to negate that it need not be dealt with
by the prosecution unless properly put into issue. Furthermore, the
11 See Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasberg, 60 Wash.
106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). Although these cases deal with attempts to dispense with the insanity
defense, their logic can be profitably used in the context of other traditional defenses.
92 For example, OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.04(A) makes it a crime to remove a child from
the place where he is found with intent to withhold the child from the legal custody of his parent.
Subsection (B) makes it an affirmative defense that it was reasonably necessary to do so in
order to preserve the child's health. The statute could as easily have said: No person shall move
a child from the place where he is found with intent to deprive the parent of custody when it is
not reasonable necessary to protect the child.
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defendant will generally have easier access to the evidence necessary
to prove this exception. These facts make it appropriate for the defen-
dant to bear at least the production burden on the exception. How-
ever, since many jurisdictions have not clearly distinguished between
the production burden and the persuasion burden, the persuasion
burden has also been placed on the defendant.
It is the rule in Ohio that when "an exception or proviso in a
criminal statute is a part of the description of the offense . . ." it
must be disproved by the state as part of its case; however, when "its
effect is merely to except specified acts or persons from the opera-
tion" of the statute, 3 the state does not bear that burden. For exam-
ple, in Moody v. State64 the court held that in a prosecution for
abortion, proof of an abortion alone was not sufficient; the state was
also required to prove that the operation was unnecessary to save the
mother's life. On the other hand, in Hale v. State,5 the court implied
that in order to convict upon a charge of unauthorized practice of
medicine, the state need only prove the rendering of medical care by
a person not licensed to do so. The statute in question provided an
exception for medical care rendered by an unlicensed person in an
emergency, but the state was not required to negate this as part of
its case-in-chief.
Given this test, it is no mean task to determine when a proviso
is part of the description of the offense and when it merely exempts
certain persons. The Ohio supreme court has indicated that the form
of the statute does not govern; rather, the court will look to see if the
proviso complies with the rationale used to justify the existence of
such a practice. Therefore the prosecution will be relieved of its bur-
den only when the exception provided for would be difficult for the
state to disprove and when the facts to prove the exception would be
readily available to the defense. " The difficulty of making this dis-
tinction may have led the drafters of the new criminal code to con-
clude that statutory exceptions upon which the defendant should bear
at least the production burden should be clearly labelled as affirma-
tive defenses.67 In addition the definition of affirmative defense in-
63 Hale v. State, 58 Ohio St. 676, 51 N.E. 154 (1898) (emphasis added).
84 17 Ohio St. 111 (1866).
58 Ohio St. 676, 51 N.E. 154 (1898).
See Moody v. State, 17 Ohio St. 111 (1866). Cheadle v. State, 4 Ohio St. 478 (1855);
State v. Dutton, 3 Ohio App. 2d 118, 209 N.E.2d 597 (Ct. App. 1965).
" OHIo REV. CODE § 2901.05(C)(1). Examples of provisions containing such affirmative
defenses are 2919.01(B) (bigamy), 2921.34(B) (escape), and 2913.03 (unauthorized use of vehi-
cle). Curiously enough, this latter defense really appears to be a negative defense; the defendant
is arguing that he reasonably believed that his use of the vehicle was authorized. He is alleging
a mistake of fact which negates the state of mind necessary for the crime, i.e., "knowingly."
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cludes those excuses which are "peculiarly within the knowledge of
the accused." 8
In the text of some cases it is said that such provisos are a matter
of defense which the defendant must raise, 9 but curiously enough no
Ohio court appears to have directly ruled upon whether the defendant
bears the persuasion burden on these issues or the necessary quantum
of proof.7 " Despite this lack of case law, it is probably proper to
conclude that Ohio, consistent with its treatment of other affirmative
defenses, would require the defendant to prove an exception by a
preponderance of the evidence.71
Proponents of the Ohio rule can make strong theoretical and
practical arguments in support of their position. As a practical mat-
ter, if the state must negate all exceptions to a given crime, it may
be forced to waste its time on issues that the defendant never intended
to raise, and it may find itself hampered by the difficulty of obtaining
evidence that by its nature is within the knowledge of the defendant.
Theoretically, 'it can be argued that, as with the confession and avoid-
ance defenses, the state has proved the elements of the crime and the
defendant is only seeking to interpose a fact which in no way negates
any of those elements. Finally, the Supreme Court has found no
consitutional imperfection in such a practice. In Morrison v.
California,7 the Court approved a law that required the defendant to
prove citizenship to avoid a verdict for the state, after the state had
proved that (a) he was in possession of real property and (b) that he
was a member of a race ineligible for naturalization. The Court noted
that requirement of the state to disprove citizenship would be an
intolerable burden, while proof of citizenship would be easy for the
defendant.73
' OHIO REv. CODE § 2901.05(C)(2).
" Hale v. State, 58 Ohio St. 676, 688, 51 N.E. 154, 158 (1898).
7' See State v. Dutton, 3 Ohio App. 2d 118, 209 N.E.2d 597 (Ct. App. 1965).
7' See State v. Casper, 106 Ohio App. 176, 154 N.E.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1958).
n 288 U.S. 591 (1932). Actually there were two cases entitled Morrison v. California. Both
dealt with different sections of California law which governed the ability of individuals of
oriental lineage to occupy real property in California. The first case approved the exception
discussed in a brief per curiain opinion that dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question. The second, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), pointed out that the first opinion had been
decided on the "convenience test", but found that the state could not require the defendant to
prove his eligibility for naturalization, since it might be as difficult for the defendant to prove
that as it would be for the state to prove ineligibility.
Morrison, like Leland v. Oregon, was decided prior to the time that the "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard was constitutionalized in Winship. Therefore it seems proper to
argue that the holding of both cases has been discredited to some degree. In fact, Justice
Rehnquist may have felt compelled to file a concurring opinion to point to this very fact.
n W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 18, § 31 at 146-52 discusses Morrison and points
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It is also probably true that in most cases the legislature could
constitutionally dispense with the exceptions that it has granted. For
example, the Ohio bigamy statute provides that a five year absence
of the accused's spouse preceding the subsequent marriage is an af-
firmative defense.74 It is difficult to understand why, if a state may
constitutionally dispense with a state of mind as to bigamy,75 it is
required to include such a proviso. Unlike the confession and avoid-
ance type defenses, these exceptions do not enjoy a long history of
use, nor are they firmly etched in our scheme of ordered justice. It
may be that if some statutes were stripped of their provisos, they
would be too broad or vague; however, this would be a problem with
only a minority of the statutes. 76
Refuting such arguments is difficult, because unlike the case of
confession and avoidance defenses, it is not possible to rely upon the
second conclusion drawn from the discussion of Wilbur, i.e. that the
state may not dispense with certain distinctions in the criminal law.
For purposes of this section, we will assume that the state could
remove fact "X" from its statute and criminalize fact "A" done in
conjunction with fact "B". This does not however make the first
Wilbur conclusion inapplicable.
When the legislature makes "X" an exception to the crime of
"A" and "B", it has indicated that it does not desire to punish "A"
and "B" alone, but only when done in the absence of "X". If this is
true, "X" is just as much an element of the crime as "A" and "B".
The difference in results is indeed "substantial" within the meaning
of Wilbur, because if "X" were present the defendant would escape
punishment. Such a practical difference should be enough to impli-
cate the Winship concerns, Le. preserving the freedom and good
name of individuals and avoiding the conviction of innocent persons.
out the close relationship between presumptions, statutory exemptions, and affirmative defen-
ses. See also Ashford & Risinger, supra note 37, at 173-74, 186-93, where they reach the same
conclusion and note that the only difference between presumptions and assumptions (as they
call affirmative defenses) is that in the former the presumption can be dispelled by a minimal
amount of evidence by the defense whereas assumptions must be disproved by a preponderance
of the evidence. They argue for applying the same constitutional test for validity to assumptions
as well as presumptions.
" OHIo REV. CODE § 2919.01.
"5 OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.01 prescribes no state of mind for the crime of bigamy. §
2901.21(B) says that unless a section clearly indicates an intent to impose strict liability,
recklessness will be read in. It is unclear whether § 2919.01 intended to dispense with any mental
element.
11 Adopting a test which would equate Winship "facts" with those which are constitution-
ally required would force courts to determine what the outer limits of the criminal law are-"a
task which . . . courts tend to avoid." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, § 21 at 151.
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So even though the state could dispense with "X", it has not done so
and must live with the structure it has built.77 Finally, the state's
difficulty in negating facts which are particularly within the knowl-
edge of the defendant is not that impressive when one remembers that
it is possible to split the burdens of proof so that the defendant need
only bear the production burden. In this situation the prosecution can
wait until the defense raises the issue. The facts necessary to mount
an attack on the defense would then be present so that the prosecu-
tion's task would be eased.7" On balance, it would seem possible to
adequately protect the state's and the defendant's interest by requir-
ing the defendant to raise the issue of an exception and its applicabil-
ity, but require the state to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
In summary it can be said that, in the case of negative defenses,
Winship requires that the state bear the burden on the elements of
the crime. Since these defenses only negate the existence of one of
the elements, the state cannot require that the defendant to raise more
than a reasonable doubt. In the case of the confession and avoidance
type defenses it can be said that (1) these defenses, no matter what
they are called, are really an element of the crime charged because
as a practical matter their existence will prohibit a conviction; since
this produces such a substantial difference in result, Wilbur requires
that the state bear the persuasion burden, and (2) some of these
defenses may be constitutionally required. Finally, it can not be
persuasively argued that statutory exceptions are constitutionally
required, but they are as a practical matter a part of the crime as
defined by the statute, and should be disproved by the state if raised
by the defendant.
D. Insanity
Up to this point little has been said about what may be the most
discussed affirmative defense: insanity. The unusual and uncertain
nature of the insanity defense requires that it be discussed separately.
Although the insanity defense is often included with the confession
and avoidance type defenses, with which it shares many characteris-
" In evaluating the "greater includes the lessor" approach, it must be noted too that there
is no guarantee that a crime consisting of "A" and "B" alone would be acceptable to the
electorate and therefore a politically viable alternative. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 37: see
also supra note 60.
11 It must be acknowledged that there may be those instances in which even such a
procedure would burden the state severely, but they would seem to be rare situations. The Court
itself in Wilbur seems to hold open the possibility of placing the persuasion burden on the
defendant in some rare cases. 95 S. Ct. at 1891-92 n.31.
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tics, it is subtly different from those defenses. Furthermore, until it
is possible to obtain general agreement as to the theoretical basis for
the insanity defense, it is difficult to place it in the framework of the
Wilbur analysis. No attempt will be made to examine the defense in
depth, but only to indicate a general approach to the problem.
Unlike other defenses, there is no general agreement upon why
the insanity defense should be recognized by the criminal law.71 It is
often said that we exculpate the legally insane individual because he
is not "blameworthy" or "culpable"; but this is not as much an
answer to the question as a conclusion. It has been suggested that the
insanity defense merely negates the mens rea requirement of the
criminal law and therefore it is no different from any other negative
defense.8" However, this approach would make the insanity defense
unavailable for strict liability crimes, a conclusion that is certainly
not generally accepted. Furthermore, it assumes that the mental ele-
ment of a crime is equivalent to the concept of mens rea, which need
not be true. Consider the case of a paranoid schizophrenic who "rea-
sonably" believes it is necessary to kill to save his own life. Can it be
said that he did not murder within the meaning of the Ohio criminal
code,8' i.e. purposely? In this case the actor's cognitive abilities are
so deficient that we will not hold him criminally responsible even
though the state has proven its case including the mental element
beyond a reasonable doubt. If mens rea means the mental element
of the crime then it is not true that insanity always negates that
element. It is true that a mental disease or defect can theoretically
negate either the volitional act requirement or the mental element of
a crime, and if this is the case it would seem clear that under Winship
the defense need only raise a reasonable doubt. It is not clear however
that all or most jurisdictions, including Ohio, will allow evidence of
a mental disease or defect for this purpose.8"
Being unable to answer the "why" question it will be necessary
to content ourselves with the generally accepted rationale for the
11 Compare H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 131-35 (1968), with
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "'Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963).
11 Goldstein & Katz, supra note 79, at 858-65.
s OHIO RE V. CODE § 2903.02.
82 People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959) is probably the best known
example of a court allowing evidence of a mental disease or defect to negate the mental element
of a crime. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794 (1952) notes that, if used as a negative defense,
the state could not make the defendant prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The Ohio
supreme court has not ruled on the Gorshen question but dictum indicates it would not allow
evidence of a mental disease or defect to negate the mental element. State v. Staten, 18 Ohio
St. 2d 13, 20, 247 N.E.2d 293, 298 (1969).
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insanity defense, i.e. that the actor is not "blameworthy." This is the
conclusion reached by the Ohio supreme court in State v. Staten,
in which the court said that "one, who does not know that his action
is wrong or does not have the capacity to avoid such action, is not a
proper subject for punishment."83 Viewed in this manner, the insan-
ity defense has much in common with the confession and avoidance
type defenses in that the defendant seeks to interpose a fact that will
bar the imposition of the criminal sanction, even though the prosecu-
tion has proved the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defense is unlike the other confession and avoidance defenses in
that it focuses on the nature and quality of the actor and not upon
the objective circumstances of the crime. The similarity, however, has
led many courts, including the Ohio supreme court, to conclude that
the defendant must prove insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 4
The argument in favor of this rule is the same that is offered to
support it in the context of the confession and avoidance type defen-
ses. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated it succinctly in Wilbur, when he
expressed his belief that the Wilbur holding was not inconsistent with
Leland v. Oregon.
Oregon's placement of the burden of proof on insanity on Leland,
unlike Maine's redefinition of homicide in the instant case, did not
effect an unconstitutional shift in the State's traditional burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all necessary elements of the
offense. . . .Having once met that rigorous burden of proof...
the State could quite consistently with such a constitutional princi-
ple conclude that a defendant who sought to establish the defense
of insanity, and thereby escape any punishment whatever for a hei-
nous crime, should bear the laboring oar of such an issue."
It must be suggested, however, that this argument does not
adequately reflect the principles which underlie the Court's decision
in Wilbur. While it is true that in most cases the insanity defense will
not allow the defendant to escape a deprivation of his personal free-
dom, it does prevent the stigma of a criminal conviction. Further-
more, of all the defenses, the insanity defense is most directly con-
cerned with the culpability of the defendant. Because of the kind of
person the actor is, we have historically held that he is not a proper
subject for the criminal sanction; society believes that he is not blame-
18 Ohio St. 2d at 20, 247 N.E.2d at 298.
Id. at 13, 247 N.E.2d at 294.
95 S. Ct. at 1893 (concurring opinion).
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worthy and the goal of the criminal law is to affix a sentence of moral
condemnation.86 Before a defendant can be convicted the issue of
insanity must be decided, either based upon an unrebutted assump-
tion or through proof. Finally, the insanity defense may be a defense
which the criminal law cannot fail to recognize. Given the long use
of the defense and its intimate relationship with the functional basis
of the criminal law, due process may require that this defense be
retained. 7
In summary, it can be suggested that the sanity of the defendant
should be considered as an element of every crime, because in the
absence of his sanity we believe that the defendant is not a proper
subject for the criminal sanction. In every case then, the elements of
a crime include not only those set out in the statutory definition of
the crime but also the defendant's sanity at the time of the act. It may
be proper for the state to assume that the defendant is sane, but once
the issue is raised the state must prove the sanity of the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt.
V. CONCLUSION
This note, like all theoretical analysis, must be based upon an
assumption, and from this assumption the course of the discussion
must necessarily flow. Since assumptions are in essence beliefs, they
cannot be proven but only stated. The belief underlying this note is
simply that the criminal sanction is the most severe control mecha-
nism society can impose and therefore should be invoked only for the
most injurious antisocial behavior and that when society does seek
to use it, society must justify its use by proof of the highest order.
Our society must, if it is to survive, protect its individual mem-
bers against injury in all its forms and degrees; however, at the same
time we are dedicated to insuring that each individual enjoy the maxi-
mum amount of personal freedom. The two goals often come into
conflict, and society's control mechanisms act at various levels to
balance these interests. It is no wonder then that the conflict should
be most intense in the criminal law because the criminal sanction is
at the same time society's most effective form of self protection and
the most destructive of individual freedoms."
At a time when other social control mechanisms seem to be
losing their effectiveness, efforts are being made to impose the crimi-
" See H. PACKER, supra note 75, at 131-35.
" See cases cited supra, note 61.
"' See H. PACKER, supra note 75, at 63-70.
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nal sanction for more and different types of anti-social behavior, and
to argue that proof of criminality should be made easier. It may be,
as some have suggested, that the legal pendulum has swung too far
away from protecting the victims of brutal crimes and too far towards
protecting the rights of the criminal.89 There are probably few among
us who feel a great deal of compassion for the deprivations suffered
by the "true criminal," but we must remember that the title of "crim-
inal" is to be applied only at the end of society's imperfect guilt
adjudication process. To the extent that we make the burden of the
prosecution easier we make it that much more likely that the title of
"criminal" will be affixed upon the names of innocent people. It must
be acknowledged that at some point theory must give way to human
practicality or else theory would dictate that no one should be tried
for fear of making an error.9 In the case of "affirmative defenses,"
however, the balance should be struck in favor of placing the persua-
sion burden on the prosecution.
Stephen D. Brandt
F. CARRINGTON, THE VICTIMs (1975).
" Christie & Pye, supra note 59.
